A Conflict Over Land by Ackerman, Francis E.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 8 | Number 2
1-1-1980
A Conflict Over Land
Francis E. Ackerman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Indigenous Studies Commons, Legal History
Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Francis E. Ackerman, A Conflict Over Land, 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 259 (1980),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/3
A CONFLICT OVER LAND
Francis E. Ackerman*
I.
American historians have made shockingly little effort to
understand the life, the societies, the cultures, the thinking,
and the feeling of the Indians, and disastrously little effort to
understand how all these affected white men and their
societies. 1
The American Indian has been accorded scant attention in some
of the most widely acclaimed studies of the history of the United
States.2 This is one aspect of the fate commonly reserved for a
conquered people, particularly where their culture is regarded as
a primitive survival that must finally disappear before the in-
evitable progress of civilization. It has been generally assumed
that the study of Indian institutions and history has no immediate
relevance to modern American society.3 However, the relation-
ship between the Indian and his European conqueror has by no
means been brought to a close.
Recently, several tribes, notably the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot in Maine, have asserted claims to extensive tracts of
land which had long since passed from their possession.' The
resulting litigation has been described as "potentially the most
complex... ever brought in the federal courts, with social and
economic impacts without precedent. . . ."I Beneath the com-
plexity of the legal issues lie deeper questions as to the nature of
the grievance that gave rise to these actions. The land claims can-
not be dismissed in simplistic terms as the attempt of a defeated
people to win back at law what was lost in war: the dealings be-
tween Indian and European were not confined exclusively to
armed hostilities, but consisted also of a long history of diplomatic
relations, treaty commitments, legislation, and transactions in
o 1980 Francis E. Ackerman
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1. Bernard de Voto, quoted in J. HOWARD, STRANGE EMPIRE 8 (1952), at introduc-
tion [hereinafter cited as HOWARD].
2. E.g., D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS (19-).
3. With some notable exceptions, many of Wvhich are referred to infra.
4. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649,
aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1975).
5. Memoiandum of Justice Dep't, to U.S. District Court for the District of Maine,
Jan. 14, 1977. 123 CONG. REc. S 3205 (1977).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
land. An understanding of the Indian attitude to land, and his
concept of the relationship of man to the land in terms of tenure
and ability to convey is therefore elementary to any attempt to
comprehend the historical context of the present land claims.
Moreover, the questions raised by the claims cannot be settled
with them. Such questions lie at the root of American and indeed
of modern European history.
The first part of this article will examine Indian concepts of
land tenure in the pre- and post-Columbian eras. The focus will
be primarily on tribes belonging to the Algonkian and Iroquoian
linguistic groups. The Algonkian group includes the Montagnais-
Naskapi of eastern Canada, the Ojibwa and Cree of Ontario, the
Micmac of Nova Scotia, the Malecite, Abenaki, Passamaquoddy,
and Penobscot of Maine, the Pequot, Narragansett, and Wam-
panoag of southern New England, as well as one Plains tribe, the
Cheyenne. The Iroquoian group comprehends the Five Nations
of the League (Seneca, Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, and Onon-
daga), the Huron, Erie, Neutrals, Susquehanna, Tuscarora, and
to the south, the Cherokee. Because attitudes toward property in
land cannot be fully understood in isolation from the culture of
which they form an integral part, the second part of the article
will attempt to situate them in a broad cultural unity. Specifical-
ly, it appears that Indian concepts of land tenure were closely
linked to an attitude to social welfare, to a rudimentary division
of labor and cooperative work patterns, to the role of govern-
ment and law in society, and to a religious world-view.
At a deeper level, a study of the relationship between European
culture and the so-called primitive culture of the Amerindian
necessitates a consideration of the attempts of liberal economic
theorists on the one hand, and Marxists on the other, to construct
a theory of the development of property rights, or a model of
social evolution. Some commentators, including structuralist an-
thropologists, have denied that it is either possible or useful to
construct such a model. The third part of the article will enter
this controversial area. Finally, in the concluding section, there is
a brief consideration of the history of interaction between the two
cultures, and of the significance of that relationship for modern
society. Obviously, the scope of the article is far too broad to
permit an exhaustive treatment of these areas of discussion: its
purpose is more to raise questions than to provide any final
answers.
II.
The conflict between the Whites and Indians that marked
[Vol. 8
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American Indian relations was basically a conflict over land.6
Most of coastal Maine from Kittery to Pemaquid passed under
the control of English settlers between 1625 and 1675. In most in-
stances, these lands were conveyed by deeds, signed by Indians.
Often, the consent of an entire band or tribe was obtained. James
Sullivan, a native of Berwick, Maine, and then Attorney General
of Massachusetts, wrote in 1801: "When the natives transferred
their right of possession to the first civilized settlers, it was not
done by the act of an individual, as of his own authority; but by
the voice of a council, assembled on the occasion." ' 7 In a brief
but illuminating monograph, Roger B. Ray has noted that "many
of the Maine Indian deeds contained no restrictions or rights
reserved and did contain a clause granting the buyers peaceable
access and possession. Today such a clause implies that the ven-
dor shall get out. But the Indians did not leave." 8 Evidently, the
Indians did not understand that in signing these instruments, they
were agreeing to quit the premises: their interpretation must have
been that they and colonists would both use the land.9
The entire history of American Indian relations, not only in
Maine but across the continent, was colored, often with tragic
results, by similar misunderstandings with regard to land. The ex-
planation is to be found in a study of the procedures by which In-
dians regulated the use of their territories.
This is a sensitive area, in which any discussion must proceed
with an awareness that the term "property" is susceptible of
many shades of meaning. It is difficult to avoid terminological
confusion where the only available language has been infused
with connotations drawn not only from the Anglo-American legal
system but also from popular conceptions that are often at
variance with the realities of that system. Thus, in the popular
mind, private ownership is often conceived in the absolute sense
in which it was understood by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
theorists. If, therefore, it requires an effort of imagination
tempered by historical analysis to arrive at a realistic assessment
of our own property institutions, it is evident that a correspond-
ingly greater effort is required to comprehend a system where
6. F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 139 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as PRUCHA].
7. J. SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 22 (1801)
[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN].
8. Ray, Maine Indians' Concept of Land Tenure, 13 ME. HiSm. Soc'Y Q. 28, 41
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Ray].
9. Id.
1980]
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the concept of ownership of land may not have existed in any
form. A second terminological warning should perhaps be noted
at this point: where the adjective "primitive" appears in the
following discussion, it refers to the relative complexity of the
social organism, as well as its level of technological achievement.
It carries no implication of inferiority in any sense whatsoever.
Where such terms are used in the discussion following, it will be
necessary to enlist the indulgence and imagination of the reader.
It has been argued that the Algonkian tribes of the north-
eastern woodlands recognized private property rights in land,
even in pre-Columbian times. 10 Frank Speck, a long-time student
of Agonkian cultures, discerned a strong tendency toward in-
dividual ownership of land in an institution he described as the
family hunting territory. Speck found this phenomenon in ex-
istence among various tribes, including the Penobscot ana the
Montagnais, during field work in the early part of this century.
Although their lands had been lost for practical purposes cen-
turies earlier, Speck was able to map the boundaries of the
Penobscot hunting territories-another indication, perhaps, of
the Indian conviction that their land had not been alienated.
We may define the family hunting group as a kinship group
composed of individuals united by blood or marriage, main-
taining the right to hunt, trap, and fish in a certain inherited
district bounded by rivers, lakes and other natural landmarks.
... With a few exceptions the whole territory claimed by each
tribe was subdivided into tracts owned from time immemorial
by the same families and handed down from generation to
generation in the male line. The almost exact bounds of these
territories were known and recognized, and trespass, which was
indeed of rare occurence [sic], was summarily punishable."
Speck appears to have assumed that the family hunting territory
had existed in pre-Columbian times on the grounds that the small
fauna (e.g., beaver) of these forest regions could be successfully
husbanded only by individual families,' 2 and that "sociological
10. Speck, Land Ownership Among Hunting Peoples in Primitive America and the
World's Marginal Areas, 22d INT'L CONG. OF AMERICANISTS 2, 323 [hereinafter cited as
Speck].
11. Id. at 327.
12. Speck & Eiseley, Montagnais Naskapi Bands and Family Hunting Districts of the
Central and Southern Labrador Penisula, 85 PROC. OF AM. PHILOS. Soc'y 215, 241
[hereinafter cited as Speck & Eiseley].
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factors are slow developers."' 3 He maintained that this institu-
tion should be placed at the core of northeastern Algonkian
culture. 4
However, this thesis has now been discredited to the point
where it is inconceivable that it will be rehabilitated. It should be
noted that even in Speck's formulation, the hunting territory
could not be described as private property: the land could not,
for example, be bought or sold. Speck claimed nonetheless that
the institution represented the emergence of a private property
system sui generis in a primitive hunting society.
It now appears that whatever attributes of a private property
system were in fact exhibited by the Algonkian hunting territory
were the result of acculturation over a 400-year period, rather
than a spontaneous development. The fallacy of Speck's argu-
ment was exposed in Eleanor Leacock's classic study": it lay in
his failure to recognize the early and pervasive importance of the
fur trade in relations between the colonists and the Algonkian
tribes. Leacock, who based her study on extensive field work
among the Montagnais, concluded that "such private ownership
of specific resources as exists has developed in response to the in-
troduction of sale and exchange into the Indian economy which
accompanied the fur trade and . . . that it was these private
rights-specifically to fur-bearing animals-which laid the basis
for individually inherited rights to land."' 6 The evidence mar-
shalled in support of this conclusion is compelling.
Trespass could only occur where the encroachment on
another's territory occurred for the purpose of hunting beaver to
sell: it was entirely permissible to kill for food. In short, the con-
cept of trespass as we understand it did not exist. Today in
Maine, private property is an established fact: the owner has a
right to prevent trespass. However, during the hunting season, an
unwritten custom (enforced by informal community sanction)
dictates that the hunter may range over any private land in search
of game. Among the Algonkian tribes affected by the pressures
of the fur trade, the reverse was true: the use of what was essen-
tially common land could be restricted only for the purpose of
hunting fur-bearing animals. Thus berrying, fishing, and bark-
gathering, as well as hunting for food, were in no way restricted
13. F. SPECK, PENOBSCOT MAN 208 (1940) [hereinafter cited as SPECK].
14. Id.
15. Leacock, The Montagnais Hunting Territory and the Fur-Trade, 56 AM. AN-
THRO. ASS'N, No. 5., pt. 2, Mem. No. 78 [hereinafter cited as Leacock].
16. Id. at 2.
19801
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and could be conducted anywhere on the territory occupied by the
tribe.17 Among the Parry Island Ojibwa, maple groves, uncon-
nected with the fur trade, continued to be communally owned. 8
Moreover, Leacock demonstrates that the Algonkian hunting ter-
ritory developed in a geographical pattern centered on the earliest
trading marts. "The inescapable fact is that the strength of in-
dividualized land-holding patterns characteristic of the western
Montagnais decreases not only northward toward the tundra,
where the Naskapi used to depend almost entirely upon the
migratory caribou, but also outward from the centre of the earliest
and most intensive fur-trade." 19
As early as 1534, Cartier was trading in furs with the Micmacs
of Chaleur Bay-almost 400 years before Speck's study."0 After
1575, as A. G. Bailey has noted, "the fur trade became of prime
concern to many European merchants."'" When Champlain en-
countered the Penobscot in 1603, they were already heavily in-
volved in the fur trade.22 Even the Jesuit missionaries who carried
Christianity into the Algonkian heartland sought beaver pelts as
zealously as they did new converts. As Frontenac wrote to Col-
bert in 1672, "they think as much of the sale of beaver pelts as of
the conversion of souls." 23 Both Bailey and Diamond Jenness
have adduced evidence that the Jesuits sought early to locate each
family on a separate territory.2 4
That such efforts were not always successful appears from the
persistence of communal regulation of land use among Algonkian
tribes. It now seems clear that individual ownership of property
rights in land of any kind was unknown in the pre-Columbian
era.2" Early sources give no indication of the existence of family
holdings: they are not mentioned in Le Jeune's account of a
winter among the Montagnais 1633-1634, nor in Pere Druillette's
record of a month-long visit in 1647.26
Prior to contact with the immigrant culture, communal owner-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. at 6.
20. A. BAILEY, THE CONFLICT OF EASTERN ALGONKIAN CULTURES 6 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BAILEY].
21. Id. at 8.
22. Leacock, supra note 15, at 12.
23. Quoted in BAILEY, supra note 20, at 111.
24. Id. at xix, 89. See also Jenness, Indians of Canada, NAT'L MUSEUM OF CANADA,
Bull. 65, at 124 (1932).
25. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 85.
26. Leacock, supra note 15, at 14.
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ship vested in the band prevailed. It is probable that, like the
Micmacs, most Algonkians allotted their lands semiannually
before the fall and winter hunts.27 The band, not the family or
tribe, was the primary unit of social organization: private family
holdings in this context would be anomalous. 8 Only after the
development of the fur trade did this communal solidarity begin
to break down, and then only with respect to the production of
furs. In this area of Algonkian economic life, "the individual's
most important ties. . . were transferred from within the band to
without, and his objective relation to other band members changed
from the co-operative to the competitive." 29 The eastern
Algonkian tribes, therefore, held their land on the basis of com-
munal tenure, with a later development of usufruct rights to
specific resources in smaller family groupings. In signing the
deeds that conveyed coastal Maine, and in later treaty ar-
rangements with the settlers, Algonkian tribes intended to share
their lands, not to alienate them. They could not be alienated.
The Cheyenne, a nomadic Plains tribe, and the westernmost
representative of the Algonkian linguistic group, recognized no
private property in land. George Bird Grinnell, among the earliest
and most sensitive observers of Plains Indian culture and an ex-
pert on the Cheyenne, wrote: "They cannot conceive of the in-
dividual ownership of land; they think of their land as held by the
tribe for those who shall come after them, who in turn may oc-
cupy it.""0 (Grinnell was writing of the attitudes of Indians in
general, but we may assume that he drew largely on his ex-
perience with his beloved Cheyenne.) Even the tribe, therefore,
was not considered the owner of its territory but rather a trustee
for future generations. "A primitive Indian can no more under-
stand such private monopolies than the average American can
understand how there could be a private monopoly of air or
light.''3 Where whites interpreted land transactions as absolute
purchases, Grinnell concludes, the Plains Indian considered-like
the eastern Algonkian-that he had granted a permit to use the
land, for a term and on conditions, though these were nowhere
explicitly stated. Grinnell cites an instance where members of the
27. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 85.
28. Id. at 86.
29. Leacock, supra note 15, at 7.
30. Grinnell, Tenure of Land Among the Indians, 9 AM. ANTHRO. 1, 2 (1907)
[hereinafter cited as Grinnell].
31. Id. at 6.
19801
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Blackfoot Tribe inquired when the land would be returned.32 It
could not be alienated.
Among the Iroquois, similarly, no individual could obtain ab-
solute title to land. Although these tribes were not horsemen of
the Plains, like the Cheyenne, and unlike the eastern Algonkians,
practiced agriculture on an extensive scale, still the land was held
in common by the tribe. 3 The individual could cultivate unoc-
cupied land and was regarded as the owner of any improvements
made, which could be bequeathed or sold." To this extent, in-
dividuals, families, and clans could hold usufruct rights."
The Iroquoian Cherokees, also an agricultural people, resem-
bled their northern relatives in many respects. There is no reason
to question the accepted view that the Cherokees held their land
in common. 6 It seems likely that in the pre-Columbian era,
Cherokee towns, which "physically resembled the open field
villages of medieval England," 37 allotted fields annually. 8 Later,
perhaps as a result of acculturation, holdings began to crystallize,
but private ownership of land did not emerge. Nineteenth-century
Cherokee law defined the relationship of the individual to the
land in unmistakable terms: the nation held the land; individuals
owned and could sell improvements made to the land they oc-
cupied but could not alienate the soil.39 Hunting grounds re-
mained strictly communal."
A broad uniformity in institutions of land ownership is discer-
nible, whether on the plains or in the forests of the Northeast,
among hunters and tillers of the soil. None of these tribes
recognized private ownership of land. The pattern is one of com-
munal tenure, in each case vested in and regulated by the most
important socio-governmental unit, whether tribe, town, or band.
Where individual occupancy of land emerged, either as an ad-
junct of an agricultural way of life, or as a result of trade and ac-
32. Id. at 4.
33. Quain, The Iroquois, in COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG PRIMITIVE
PEOPLES 240-48 (M. Mead ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Quain].
34. L. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE IROQUOIS 317 (1904) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
35. Quain, supra note 33, at 248 n.1.
36. R. COTTERILL, THE SOUTHERN INDIANS: THE STORY OF THE CIVILIZED TRIBES
BEFORE REMOVAL 13 (1954) [hereinafter cited as COTTERILL].
37. J. REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: PRIMITIVE LAW OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 29-30 (19--)
[hereinafter cited as REID].
38. Id.
39. Id. at 130-32. See A. DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 14 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as DEno].
40. REID, supra note 37, at 134-35.
[Vol. 8
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culturation, usufruct rights to the products of the land and in
some cases ownership of improvements made were recognized.
This uniformity, standing in striking contrast to the many dif-
ferences and idiosyncrasies of these tribes, suggests that despite
those differences their institutions of land use might be better
understood as part of an overarching cultural pattern, common
to them and perhaps to many other primitive peoples.
III.
In the simple question of how we treat the land, next to people
our most precious resource, our entire way of life is involved."
Whomsoever cometh in, when they are eating, they offer them
to eat of that which they have .... ,1
Institutions regulating the ownership and use of land were
closely linked in the Algonkian and Iroquoian cultures to an at-
titude to social welfare that permeated every facet of tribal ex-
istence. The welfare of each member was a matter of immediate
concern to the tribe or band as a social unit. Hospitality,
generosity, and sharing were indeed characteristic of all Indian
societies.43 In a cultural system where law and custom merge, and
public opinion is often an extraordinarily effective sanction, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the pressure to share with
one's neighbor rose to the level of the equivalent of a legal duty.44
Moreover, if the refusal to share could be visited with unen-
durable reprobation, to excel in compliance with the norm could
be a source of great prestige. Often, such sharing was not a
parcelling out of identifiably private goods or food but the
culmination of a course of cooperative activity, whether venatic
or agricultural. Perhaps the system is best described, in J. H.
Steward's words, as "a kind of subsistence insurance. ' 46 Its
universality is attested to by the literature.47
41. E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 107 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SCHUMACHER].
42. Williams, Key Into the Language of America, 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HIST. SOC'Y FOR 1794, 208 (1810) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
43. P. FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF NORTH
AMERICA 262 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FARB].
44. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 235 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL]; BAILEY, supra note 20, at 86; REID, supra note 37, at 70.
45. Quain, supra note 33, at 280.
46. Quoted in Leacock, supra note 15, at 7.
47. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 235; BAILEY, supra note 20, at 85;
1980]
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The link between land and welfare is not far to seek: the food
supply went with the land. A communal regulation of land use
offered the only means of assuring the welfare of the members of
tribe or band. Where the land was used on a cooperative basis by
the social unit as a whole, this link is clearly visible in its purest
form. Less obviously, perhaps, it also helped to shape other
regulatory methods employed by Algonkian and Iroquoian tribes.
Where the land was allocated to individuals or smaller groups on
a seasonal or annual basis, as among the eastern Algonkians or
the early Cherokee, considerations of equity and the needs of the
disadvantaged could operate freely.4" In both instances, where
later developments, including acculturation, resulted in a
crystallization of holdings, communal rights to use the land for
purposes essential to welfare persisted. Among the civilized tribes
in Indian Territory (including the Cherokee), timber and mines
became an important source of public revenue.49
Moreover, the development of rights in the individual to oc-
cupy the land he worked and to own, bequeath, and sell improve-
ments made, as among the later Cherokee and Iroquois, is in no
way inconsistent with this pattern. Nineteenth-century Cherokee
leaders explicitly avowed that the policy underlying this system of
land tenure was the prevention of monopoly. D. W. Bushyhead,
Principal Chief of the Cherokee, stated in 1881 that "the only
difference between your land system and ours is that the unoc-
cupied surface of the earth is not a chattel to be sold and
speculated in by men who do not use it."0 J. P. Reid has sug-
gested that this explanation for the rule that ultimate ownership
of the land remained vested in the nation was a rationalization,
and that the original aim was to prevent the alienation of land to
non-Cherokees." This interpretation simply does not make sense,
in view of the facts that at no time in Cherokee history could the
land be alienated, and in any case, the rule did not prevent the
alienation of rights of occupancy and improvements to non-
Cherokees, often with deleterious results. Bushyhead's statement
can be viewed as a rationalization only in the sense that it
represented a relatively sophisticated formulation of a principle
that had been implicit in the land use systems of the Iroquoian
Quain, supra note 33, at 280; DEBO, supra note 39, at 14-15; MORGAN, supra note 34, at
318; Williams, supra note 42.
48. Ray, supra note 8, at 34.
49. DEBo, supra note 39, at 15-18, 25.
50. Quoted in REID, supra note 37, at 131-32.
51. Id. at 133.
[Vol. 8
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and Algonkian tribes. The principle might be restated as follows:
to the extent that the individual is differentiated from the group
in his economic activities, he has a vested right to the products of
his labor,52 insofar as these rights are not in derogation of similar
rights in others, or the welfare of the community.
When a field is to be broken up, they have a very loving,
sociable, speedy way to dispatch it: all the neighbors, men and
women, forty, fifty, a hundred &c., join and come in to help
freely. With friendly joining they break up their fields, build
their forts, hunt the woods, stop and kill fish in the rivers; it
being true with them as in all the world, in the affairs of earth
and heaven: By concord, little things grow great; by discord,
the greatest come to nothing: concordia res parvae crescunt,
discordia maximae dilabuntur.1
Institutions of land tenure were similarly linked to the
cooperative work patterns that were to be found in all Algonkian
and Iroquoian tribes in the pre-Columbian era. Early Cherokee
townspeople worked their fields together and stored their produce
in a common warehouse."4 The Iroquois had developed tightly
knit mutual aid societies: planting, cultivation, and the harvest
were highly organized cooperative activities." Among the eastern
Algonkian, too, "the spirit of mutual helpfulness appears to have
prevailed" in all matters related to the food supply.5 6 This spirit
persisted throughout the history of Indian relations with the set-
tler culture, and was often their shield in the face of overwhelm-
ing adversity.
"Faced by hundreds of special restrictions which do not apply
to their white neighbors, Indians have survived on land where the
white man would starve to death, and under regulations which
would drive any race of men to insanity," Felix Cohen has writ-
ten: "The secret of this survival may perhaps be found in the In-
dians' perennial and drought-resistant spirit of generosity and co-
operation. Commissioners have tried in vain, as one commis-
sioner put it, to teach the Indians to say 'I' instead of 'we'. Their
failure has been the Indians' success.""' It should be noted that
52. Id. at 129.
53. Williams, supra note 42, at 221.
54. REID, supra note 37, at 138.
55. Quain, supra note 33, at 250-51.
56. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 85.
57. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A Case-Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 352-53 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
1980]
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cooperation in its pre-Columbian form depended to a large extent
on the existence of little more than a rudimentary division of
labor. In this perception at least, Friedrich Engels did not err.
Cooperative work patterns were a primary factor in forging the
systems of land tenure analyzed above. Even where acculturation
broke down those patterns in some areas of economic life, and
the division of labor became more complex,5" the spirit of social
responsibility remained a deep-rooted feature of Iroquoian and
Algonkian insititutions. "The Sachems, although they have an
absolute monarchy over the people, yet they will not conclude of
aught that concerns all, either laws or subsidies or wars, unto
which the people are averse, and by gentle persuasion cannot be
brought.""
It is apparent that these elements of Iroquoian and Algonkian
culture were reciprocally interdependent. Another such element,
and perhaps the keystone of the cultural arch, is to be found in
an approach to government which, again in spite of many super-
ficial differences, was common to all these tribes. In essence,
government took the form of a primitive democracy based on
consensus.
Until the nineteenth century, the Cherokee Tribe had no na-
tional government, consisting only of a grouping of townships
bound together by a common culture, law, and language. 60 The
only regular government institution was based on the township.6'
It took the form of a council, consisting of an assembly of all
adult citizens, male and female, meeting every night except dur-
ing the hunting season. The council's function was deliberative in
that its decisions were ad hoc rather than legislative or ad-
judicative; its procedure was democratic in that all speakers were
heard with respect, but decisions were reached by consensus
rather than majority vote. No decision was taken until all opposi-
tion had disappeared. Since this system survived centuries of con-
tact with the immigrant culture, it must be assumed that it was an
extremely effective guarantor of social harmony. As J. P. Reid
has commented, "What is anarchy to us may have been order to
them. '"62 There was no official authority with executive powers:
58. The Cherokees practiced slavery. See REID, supra note 37, at 129. So did the
Eastern Algonkians, but slavery was a prelude to adoption into the tribe. BAILEY, supra
note 20, at 91.
59. Williams, supra note 42, at 230.
60. REID, supra note 37, at 36.
61. Id. at 28-30.
62. Id. at 50.
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leadership was exercised through influence and persuasion rather
than command. To a colonial militia captain, writing in 1754, this
feature of the Cherokee system was worthy of remark:
The Savages are an odd kind of People; as there is no law
nor subjection amongst them, they can't be compelled to do
any thing. . . . So what is called great and leading Men
amongst them, are commonly old and middle-aged People,
who know how to give a Talk in favour of whom they have a
Fancy for. .... 63
The Iroquois system of government was characterized by a
more sharply defined institutional framework. Nonetheless,
Frank Speck has described this system as "decidedly
democratic." '64 Other scholars have attacked this view on the
ground that the fifty sachem (chieftainship) titles were rigidly
controlled, that only males belonging to certain matrilineages
could hold them, and that sachems were chosen only by women
of the lineage.65 While it is true that this procedure is not
democratic in the modern sense, it should be remembered that
corresponding Anglo-American procedures are not the only
method of arriving at a representative system. And indeed, some
of the more important institutions in the American constitutional
framework-notably the Supreme Court-are not democratic,
and yet play a central role in the formation and interpretation of
a national consensus. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that
the Iroquois system was not highly effective in producing a
representative council and in interpreting consensus. Every citizen
was eligible for some position of responsibility, including women;
and outstanding skill in hunting or war was often recognized in
the selection of leaders. 66 It seems likely that the comparative
rigidity of Iroquois institutions was designed to internalize
whatever tendencies toward intratribal conflict may have existed,
while at the same time producing a system as representative, as
open, and as consensus-oriented as that of the Cherokees.
Chieftainship among the eastern Algonkian tribes was not in-
stitutionalized to the same degree and depended on continued in-
fluence and respect. 67 Decisions were reached by persuasion and
63. Letter from Raymond Demere to N.H. Lyttleton, quoted in REID, supra note 37,
at 53.
64. Speck, The Iroquois, CRAN3ROOK INST. OF Sci., Bull. 23 (1955), at 26.
65. FARB, supra note 43, at 99.
66. Quain, supra note 33, at 244.
67. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 91-92.
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consensus. A Jesuit observer noted in 1612 that among the
eastern Algonkians, "each man is his own master and his own
protector. They have sagamores . . . but their authority is most
precarious, if indeed that may be called authority to which obe-
dience is in no wise obligatory." 68 The Cheyenne Council of 44
was a more permanent political structure, but again, it was
grounded on a concern for representation and consensus." There
was always one alien member of the council, as a guarantee of
representation for those Cheyenne living among the Sioux, and
overall, one representative for every hundred persons or less.
Contact between the council member and his constituency was
carefully maintained. The chiefs were dominant figures within
their family groups and have been described as the embodiment
of public opinion. 7 The judgment of R. H. Lowie that "in
general the absence of central authority is one of the most im-
pressive features of North American society,"'" is therefore unex-
ceptionable.
A coordinate feature of these cultures was the limited role
played by coercion in the enforcement of decisions. Coercive
powers did exist in some instances, for example, in the Cheyenne
military societies, whose function was to keep order on the march
and to select and organize camping sites .7  But it is likely that
their power had grown considerably in response to the recurrence
of crisis, threatening the very survival of the tribe, which dogged
the Cheyenne throughout the history of their relations with the
settler culture. Even in these circumstances, it remained true that
where different groups within the tribe or band failed to reach
agreement on a course of action, they went their separate ways."
Contact with the white man had a similarly disruptive effect on
other Indian cultures in this respect. B. H. Quain notes that the
European presence and influence gave rise to a militaristic
tendency in Iroquois society: "the identity of their culture was
being submerged in a pathological development of military op-
portunism.""7 Among the Algonkian Penobscot and Abenaki,
68. Quoted in R. LowIE, PRIMITIVE SocIETY 384 (1920) [hereinafter cited as LOWIE].
69. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 67 et seq.
70. Id.
71. LowiE, supra note 68, at 385.
72. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 99 et seq.
73. See the history of the celebrated march of Dull Knife and Little Wolf, as
rendered in G. GRINNELL, THE FIGHTING CHEYENNES, 384-411 (1977); and see MARl SAN.
DOZ, CHEYENNE AUTUMN.
74. Quain, supra note 33, at 247.
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French officers acted as self-appointed war chiefs in leading the
Indians against the English." Instances were recorded of
Scotsmen joining Montagnais-Naskapi bands and becoming
leaders.76 The Cherokee ultimately developed a sophisticated con-
stitutional system on the Anglo-American model."
But until the nineteenth century, the role played by coercive
enforcement in Cherokee society was minimal,'7 and this was so
in other Iroquoian and Algonkian tribes to an even later date.
Public opinion was a powerful force, raising social obligations to
a near-legal level; 79 where it was ineffective, either the nonconfor-
mity was simply ignored, or people agreed to disagree." This
configuration can be observed, for example, in attitudes to per-
sonal property and theft. It is generally accepted that ownership
of personal property was recognized in Algonkian and Iroquoian
tribes.8' Theft, however, rarely occurred;82 a contemporary wrote
of the Montagnais that "the doors of the French are open to
them because their hands are to be trusted." 83 Where it did occur
within the tribe it was usually overlooked, perhaps on the
assumption that the thief stole because of need-a reflection of
the concern for social welfare. For this reason, it is necessary to
speak cautiously of a private property system even in the area of
personalty. 4
The interconnections between consensus government and the
absence of coercive enforcement on the one hand, and institutions
of land tenure on the other, are fairly evident and may be briefly
traced. First, the division of land into private holdings leads to at-
tachments and makes possible the growth of central authority.
Montesquieu expressed this with characteristic clarity (translated):
"These peoples enjoy great freedom: because they do not cultivate
the soil, they are not tied down: they are wanderers, vagabonds;
75. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 92.
76. Leacock, supra note 15, at 40.
77. REID, supra note 37, at 36.
78. Id. at 36, 231.
79. Id. at 70. See also LOWIE, supra note 68, at 186; LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra
note 44, at 264; Malinowski, A New Instrument for the Interpretation of Law-Especially
Primitive 51 YALE L.J. 1237, 1247 (1942).
80. See note 73 supra.
81. REID, supra note 37, at 140-41; LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 233;
BAILEY, supra note 20, at 85.
82. See, e.g., D. JENNESS, THE INDIANS OF CANADA 139 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
JENNESS].
83. Quoted in BAILEY, supra note 20, at 91.
84. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 226.
1980]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
AMERICAN INDIA N LA W REVIEW
and if a chief were to try to take away their freedom, they would
immediately look for another leader . . Montesquieu was
referring only to nomadic cultures, but the observation holds good
for agricultural peoples with a communal tenure system. Where the
land is held by the community, the individual is not bound to any
particular plot, and the formulation of policy with regard to the
land is a communal function not requiring the mediation of central
authority.
Second, the growth of a system of private property in land pro-
motes the development of central authority in that it becomes
necessary to regulate it and protect it. Consequently it results in
the parallel growth of a law enforced by coercive sanction.
Montesquieu also understood this point: "It is land division that
primarily increases the civil code. Among nations where this divi-
sion has not taken place, there are very few civil laws. One could
call the institutions of these peoples customs rather than laws." 86
The relative absence of central authority in Algonkian and Iro-
quoian society also was dependent upon other facets of their
cultural system: it is impossible to conceive that consensus
government could have functioned without the social emphasis
on cooperation and shared welfare concerns.
"They adore him in everything they see. When they see
anything that's fine or curious, especially when they look upon
the sun or stars, they cry out, 0 Great Spirit, we discern thee in
everything." 8 The cultural ethos surrounding Iroquoian and
Algonkian institutions of land tenure was also expressed in a
religious world-view, which stood in a dialectical relationship to
other cultural elements, both deriving from them and at the same
time strengthening and informing them.
The idea that the Godhead was immanent in all created works
permeated Indian culture, and found expression in an attitude of
deep reverence for nature and for the earth. 8 In contrast to the
Christian theology of the settler culture, the Indians did not
recognize any discontinuity between man and nature, nor be-
tween nature and supernatural. 9 Jesuit missionaries found that
85. MONTESQUiEU, DE L'EsPRIT DES Lois 300 (Classiques Gamier, 1961).
86. Id.
87. BARON DE LAHONTAN, 2 NEW VOYAGES TO NORTH AMERICA 437 (R.G. Thwaites
ed.).
88. Grinnell, supra note 30, at 3, 6.
89. Ray, supra note 8, at 36; BAiLEY, supra note 20, at 133.
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their Algonkian pupils encountered difficulties in comprehending
the concepts of heaven, hell, and the soul,90 while on the other
hand they took practical strictures, such as "love thy enemy"
quite literally-rather to the embarrassment of their mentors.9'
The concepts of immanence and transcendence were
understood by the Indian as a synthesis rather than a dichotomy.
In the words of Black Elk, a holy man of the Oglala Sioux:
We should understand well that all things are the works of the
Great Spirit. We should know that he is within all things, the
trees, the grasses, the rivers, the mountains, and all the four-
legged animals and winged peoples; and even more important,
we should understand that he is also above all these things and
peoples. 2
For this reason, material wealth beyond the requirements of sub-
sistence meant little to the Indian.93 In a very real sense, his
wealth was spiritual, but his spirituality was in no way divorced
from life in the world.
In contrast, the settler culture regarded nature as secular and
despiritualized. A secular view of nature was central to the
Weltanschauuing of European expansion and industrialism. This
cannot be better appreciated than in the words of Francis Bacon,
the earliest prophet of that western instrumental rationality,
which has been the driving force in the development of science
and technology. Bacon's trumpet summoned men to arms, that
they might turn "with united forces against the nature of things,
to storm and occupy her castles and strongholds, and to extend
the bounds of -human empire as far as God Almighty in his
goodness may permit." '94
To the Indian, this ideology constituted sacrilege. That Indians
held land in communal tenure of one form or another was a
reflection not only of the view that the land was a communal
resource but also that the land itself was part of a broader com-
munity-between man, nature, and the Creator. Man was the
divinely appointed guardian of the land, and to appropriate it
would have meant a betrayal of trust.95
90. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 20 et seq.; id. at 145.
91. Id. at 97.
92. Quoted in Epes Brown, The Spiritual Legacy of the American Indian, in
SOURCES 344 (T. Roszak ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Epes Brown].
93. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 91.
94. F. BACON, from Da AUGMENTIS.
95. Epes Brown, supra note 92, at 345.
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The misunderstandings that surround transactions in land be-
tween Indian and settler were therefore also religious misunder-
standings. The result was a spiritual tragedy of incalculable pro-
portions. Hopi religious leaders wrote to President Nixon to ex-
press their assessment of this tragedy:
The white man, through his insensitivity to the way of nature,
has desecrated the face of Mother Earth. The white man's ad-
vanced technological capacity has occurred as a result of his
lack of regard for the spiritual path and for the way of all liv-
ing things .... The white man's desire for material possessions
and power has blinded him to the pain he has caused Mother
Earth by his quest for what he calls natural resources. All over
the country, the waters have been tainted, the soil broken and
defiled, the air polluted. Living creatures die from poisons left
because of industry. . . . We have accepted the responsibility
designated by our prophecy to tell you that all life will stop
unless men come to know that everyone must live in peace, and
in harmony with nature. Only those people who know the
secrets of Nature, the mother of us all, can overcome the possi-
ble destruction of all land and life.96
IV.
They have got as far as they can go, because they own their
land in common. It is Henry George's system, and under that
there is no enterprise to make your home any better than that
of your neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bot-
tom of civilization.9 7
In describing the way in which legal systems arise,.., our aim
ought to be to strike averages and to discover the balance of
forces, not to trace the innumerable fluctuation of the growth
and decay of actual laws."
Algonkian and Iroquoian institutions of land tenure were an
integral part of a cultural configuration common to many Indian
tribes. The diversity of languages, history, geography, and
cultural heritage which the tribes exhibit in many other respects
makes this uniformity all the more striking. Its very existence sug-
gests that it might best be analyzed as a phase of human cultural
development, and that it may be possible to construct a model of
96. Excerpted in M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 670 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as PRICE].
97. Senator Henry Dawes, 1884, quoted in DEBO, supra note 39, at 22.
98. P. VINOGRADOFF, 2 OUTLINES OF HISTOaICAL JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1920).
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social evolution, and within it, a theory for the development of
property rights. For many reasons, this is a controversial area.
Many attempts have been made to construct such a model, based
on radically differing epistemology. These theories have differed
widely as to the role to be assigned to the development of proper-
ty rights in cultural evolution. Moreover, one model-encap-
sulated in the nineteenth-century idea of progress-is still current
in the popular mind and dies hard even in the works of reputed
scholars. Others, often in response to the obvious ethnocentrism
of the popular concept of civilization, have denied that it is either
useful or possible to construct a model of evolution.
Claude Levi-Strauss, the great structural anthropologist, stands
among the latter group. He attacked evolutionism primarily on
the ground that it represented an unscientific attempt to extend
the Darwinian theory of biological evolution into the area of an-
thropology, based on ethnocentric nineteenth-century preconcep-
tions.
It is really an attempt to wipe out the diversity of cultures
while pretending to accord them full recognition . . . prior in
date to the scientific theory of biological evolution, social
evolutionism is thus too often merely a pseudo-scientific mask
for an old philosophical problem, which there is no certainty of
our ever solving by observation or inductive reasoning. .... 99
Certainly, it is clear that crypto-social Darwinism can no longer
be accorded a place in any theory of evolution. It may also be
true that no scientific theory of social evolution is possible: but
the point should be made that a theory of evolution can be a
useful framework for historical analysis, without laying claim to
scientific validity. While it is proper that the social scientist
should insist upon recognition of the diversity of cultures, it re-
mains that the historian would ultimately be left with no field of
analytic activity if it were denied that a historically conceived
theory of evolution was possible.
Earlier diffusionists who attacked unilinear evolutionism often
had axes of their own to grind. R. H. Lowie, a professed diffu-
sionist, in criticizing the Marxist conception of a stage of
primitive communism, sought to demonstrate that the nuclear
family was the oldest and most universal social unit.' 0 Frank
99. C. LEVI-STRAUSS, STRucruRAL ANTHROPOLOGY 282 et seq. (n.d.) [hereinafter
cited as LEVi-STRAUSS].
100. LoWIE, supra note 79, preface to 1947 ed.
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Speck attempted to establish that at least some primitive societies
recognized private property rights in land.' 0 ' It is not difficult to
detect, in both of these instances, an effort to render institutions
central to Western industrial society-the family and private pro-
perty-immune from social criticism, by proving that they were
the result of innate and irrepressible drives common to all
mankind.' 0 2 Diffusionism could thus conceal a more insidious
form of ethnocentrism.
Other scholars simply never came to grips with either the
epistemological premises underlying theories of evolution, or
with the core of the evolutionist argument itself. Such confusion
is apparent in the work of Melville Herskovits, who wrote that
"it is difficult to see how the fact of the total absence among a
given tribe of private ownership of any good, should it be
established, could serve as the basis of an argument to abolish in-
dividual tenure in our particular society."' 0 3 This shaft falls wide
of the mark: the baseless prescriptivism which Herskovits de-
nounced forms no part of Marxist evolutionism, nor of any other
theory that has been advanced in scholarly circles.
An evolutionist theory need not be based on the nineteenth-
century idea of progress. It need not regard one society as more
advanced than another in any evaluative sense. Nor is it necessary
for such a theory to postulate development toward an inevitable
goal; nor to lay claim to scientific validity; nor to indulge in
mindless prescriptivism. Objections based on contrary supposi-
tions, while they may constitute valid criticisms of a particular
theory, therefore do not really reach questions as to the utility or
possibility of a theory of evolution.' 0 4 It is here maintained that
the construction of such a theory is both useful and feasible in
precisely the same sense as history is both useful and feasible. The
study of history is an effort to attain some level of collective self-
knowledge: to constrict its field is to hinder the exercise of prac-
tical wisdom in the affairs of men and women. It should be em-
phasized that a theory of evolution is a tentative theory of
history, not an exhaustive account of history. But without such a
theory, history becomes an unintelligible jumble of unrelated par-
ticulars.
It is with this in mind, and in terms of the foregoing discussion
101. See section II supra.
102. See FARB, supra note 43, at 56-57, for an assessment of Speck's work.
103. M. HERSKOVITS, ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 330 (1952).
104. These arguments have been made, with differing emphasis, by FARB, supra note
43, at 9 et seq., 414, and by E. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 288 et seq. (1954).
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of Iroquoian and Algonkian institutions of land tenure, that this
essay turns to an assessment of two theoretical systems: those of
Friedrich Engels1"5 and Harold Demsetz. °6
The dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination
of a career of which property is the end and aim, because such
a career contains the elements of self-destruction. Democracy
in government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and
privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher
plane of society to which experience, intelligence and
knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a revival, in a higher
form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient
gentes.1o7
Lewis H. Morgan, lawyer and railroad lobbyist and author of
the League of the Iroquois (1851), and Ancient Society (1877), is
still regarded as the greatest pioneering thinker in the area of
social anthropology. Levi-Strauss has acknowledged a debt to
Morgan, 0 18 who has been described as an early structuralist.1°9
However, his work has been discarded in many of its details, and
he has been attacked by numerous scholars for his rigid unilinear
evolutionism. °10 It is no exaggeration to say that it was Morgan's
work that brought evolutionism into disrepute in Western social
theory.
Morgan drew heavily on the work of Charles Darwin in the
construction of his theory.I' It was in a sense a theory of the
natural selection of institutions, resulting in the development of
those most favorable to the evolution of the species. Morgan's
thesis did not end, however, in the Social Darwinism that Grin-
nell reluctantly accepted when he wrote that in the final analysis,
Amerindian history reflected "the inexorable natural law that the
weaker must perish while the fitter shall survive.""' 2 Instead,
Morgan advanced a cyclical or spiral view of history, beginning in
105. F. Engels, Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in MARX &
ENGELS, SELECTED WORKS 509-83 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Engels].
106. Demsetz, Toward an Economic Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV.
347 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Demsetz].
107. L. MORGAN, ANcINrr SOCIETY 562-63 (1877) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
108. LEvi-STRAuss, supra note 99, at 282.
109. E. TERRAY, LE MARXISME DEVANT LES SOCIETIES PRIMITIVES 37 (M. Klopper tr.
1972) [hereinafter cited as TERRAY].
110. See LEvi-STRAUss, supra note 99; LoVIE, supra note 68.
111. TERRAY, supra note 109, at 19.
112. Grinnell, supra note 30, at 6.
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the primitive communism and democracy that he had discerned
among the Iroquois, passing through a series of "ethnic periods"
in the development of private property institutions, and culminat-
ing in a revival of "the liberty, equality and fraternity of the an-
cient gentes." " 13
The ambivalence in the responses Morgan has evoked among
modern social scientists can be explained by reference to his ir-
resoluble theoretical confusion. It is certainly true that Morgan
saw himself, like Darwin, as an empirical scientist: he maintained
that social evolution could be analyzed in the same terms as
animal evolution, and claimed that his theory was scientifically
valid. It was this claim that so irked Levi-Strauss and others."14
Emmanuel Terray has attempted to rehabilitate Morgan, arguing
that it was not his purpose "to write a history of humanity, but
to construct a theory of that history. . .. "I Terray, however,
betrays his own disorientation in this argument. "When Morgan
was examining the transition from one form to another, he was
not concerned with the various pathways followed by any par-
ticular society: he left such facts to the historian.""' And at
another point: "he left the study of accidental circumstances to
the historian."11 7
But surely the construction of theories of history is peculiarly
the province of the historian: and since the prediction of causa-
tional sequences is of the essence of modern science, it must be
admitted that the task of making sense of the innumerable varia-
tions in the institutions of particular societies is the province of
the social scientist. To the extent, therefore, that Morgan's claim
to scientific validity is taken seriously, his theory must be judged
by reference to these variations, and its utility as an instrument
for prediction. Not surprisingly, the theory is totally inadequate,
viewed in this light.
Morgan was not always true to his scientific pretensions. While
materialist determinism is perhaps the most consistent theme in
his work, he could appear in a variety of different guises. Thus in
the space of two pages, he states that "the Aryan family
represents the central stream of human progress, because it pro-
duced the highest type of mankind, and because it has proved its
intrinsic superiority by gradually assuming the control of the
113. MORGAN, supra note 107.
114. LEvi-STRAuss, supra note 99; LOWE, supra note 68.
115. TERRAY, supra note 109, at 24.
116. Id. at 32.
117. Id.
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earth"; that "civilization must be regarded as an accident of cir-
cumstances"; and in the same breath, speaks of "the plan of the
Supreme Intelligence to develop a barbarian out of a savage.""1
18
Elsewhere, he asserted that "it will be recognized generally that
the substance of human history is bound up with the growth of
ideas. . . .""" Morgan could appear as scientist or historian; as
racist, Deist, or Idealist; and he could implicitly deny the possi-
bility of constructing any theory of evolution when that was the
very task he had set himself.
While Morgan can never be extricated from this morass, and
many of his conclusions, including those relating to kinship
systems, must be rejected out of hand, his work remains a rich
mine of inspiration for historians and social scientists alike. Karl
Marx took 98 pages of notes from Ancient Society;'2° and it was
to Morgan that Friedrich Engels, Marx's great collaborator,
turned in formulating his theory of the origins of private property
and the state.
Two central features of Morgan's work immediately recom-
mended themselves to Engels. The first was the view that "the
arts of subsistence" was the sphere of human existence which
determined whether a given society could progress to a higher
stage in the hierarchy of evolution. As Terray has noted,
"Morgan's arts of subsistence are, in fact, no different from
Marx's productive forces; the 'ethnic period' is the mode of pro-
duction together with the juridical and political superstructures it
has called forth." '' In a letter to Kautsky, Engels stated that
"within the limits set by his subject, Morgan spontaneously dis-
covered Marx's materialist conception of history."' It is not
often remarked that Marxist social theory had these Darwinian
antecedents. Engels also seized upon the cyclical, or spiral view of
history, for obvious reasons: it was in perfect harmony with
theories already advanced by Marx and derived from Hegel.
However, Engels dealt selectively with Morgan's work, and his
theory is in no way vitiated by inconsistency. While he did repeat
many of Morgan's mistakes, particularly in his discussion of kin-
ship structures, these need not concern us here. What is most im-
pressive is the accuracy with which Engels portrayed early Indian
society in relation to those cultural elements discussed above:
118. MORGAN, supra note 107.
119. Id. at 311.
120. TERRAY, supra note 109, at 21.
121. Id. at 66.
122. Quoted id. 21.
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communal land tenure, consensus democracy, the concern for
social welfare, and cooperative work patterns.
Everything runs smoothly without soldiers, gendarmes or
police; without nobles, kings, governors, prefects or judges;
without prisons, without trials. All quarrels and disputes are
settled by the whole body of those concerned-the gens or the
tribe... the household is run in common and communistically
by a number of families, the land is tribal property, only the
small gardens being temporarily assigned to the households....
Those concerned decide, and in most cases, century-old custom
has already regulated everything. There can be no poor and
needy-the communistic household and the gens know their
obligations to the aged, the sick and those disabled in war. All
are free and equal, including the women .... 2
In Engels's theory, this cultural unity represented a universal
stage of primitive communism. It was a system which, however,
was doomed to extinction, 2 " because it was based on a rudimen-
tary division of labor. In brief outline, Engels held that changes
in the means of production brought inevitable class divisions,
beginning with the institution of slavery, and necessitating the
development of private property. Conflict between social classes
could only be contained by the rise of the state.12 Ultimately,
Engels concluded, the state was incapable of reconciling these an-
tagonisms-rather, it exacerbated them: and it would inevitably
fall.' 26 Class divisions had arisen originally in response to the
need of a more efficient system of production: with the inability
of the state to resolve the attendant social conflicts, class divi-
sions would become a hindrance to production,' 27 and would
disappear with the fall of the state.
A criticism of Engels's theory is a formidable task. At its core
is the concept of historical materialism, which permitted Marx
and Engels to claim that they had discovered a science of history
which could serve as a basis for prediction and was universally
applicable. There are obvious difficulties with such a claim, for it
can never be exhaustively verified: and if it cannot be verified,
where is its scientific utility? But, nor can the theory be disproved
simply by picking holes in its particular conclusions-the holes
123. Engels, supra note 105, at 519.
124. Id. at 520.
125. Id. at 570.
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id. at 579.
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can always be patched. It is for this reason that the only useful
criticism of Engels will be on epistemological grounds.
It is characteristic of the materialist view of history that it ex-
cludes from its analysis any consideration of the capacity of the
human mind for reflexive self-consciousness. Marxist social
theory, again like Social Darwinism at the opposite extreme,
begins and ends in determinism-and polemical ideology. Marx
expressed this tendency in his early writings: "La devenir-
philosophie du monde doit maintenant se transformer dans le
devenir-monde de la philosophie." 2
Marxist social theory, like Social Darwinist evolutionism,
results in the assimilation of history into the social sciences. This
means the death of history as an independent discipline. But it is
too early to write such an epitaph for history. It is through
history that we attain some measure of collective self-knowledge
on the basis of which to act wisely: and polemics cannot con-
tribute to self-knowledge, nor determinism serve as a basis for ac-
tion. The historian should approach his field with humility, in an
awareness that he cannot transcend the limitations of his own
historical point of vantage: like the philosopher, he "cannot leap
over Rhodes."" 9 The only historical method that permits this ap-
proach is some variant of the Hegelian dialectic. Unlike theories
of causation drawn from the natural sciences, the concept of the
dialectic allows an appreciation of the quality of free play which
human consciousness brings to the relationship between the en-
vironment, man, and ideas in history.'30 This is the only ap-
proach to history that can lead to a political orientation that is
not a priori, and to a coherent philosophy of action.
Engels's theory of the origins of private property and the state,
notwithstanding these epistemological flaws, has contributed
more to our understanding of the historical relationship between
primitive cultures and modern civilization than any other that has
been advanced. If it is shorn of the claims to scientific validity
and universality, it can be regarded as a model, rather than as an
exhaustive account of evolution. Few historians would deny that
the division of labor and the mode of production are central fac-
tors in the analysis of any society, or that class conflict is an im-
protant motive force in history. The idea that history moves in
spirals is the logical outgrowth of the Hegelian dialectic: in the
128. Quoted in J. HYPPOLITE, ETUDES SUR MARX Er HEGEL.
129. 0. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
130. Marx rejected the dialectic sub silentio: dialectical materialism is simply a contra-
diction in terms.
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flow of history, each current contains its antithesis, and is
ultimately absorbed by it to produce a new synthesis. But it
should be emphasized that the process is not a mechanical one. It
was Marx's and Engels's postulate of a final and total synthesis
that resulted in the reduction of the dialectic to a tireless
mechanical three-step, and in the death of history.
Even without the claims to universality and scientific validity,
Engels's concept of a stage of primitive communism seems to
have been substantially accurate.
"This is the basic explanation, I believe, for the preponderance
of single rather than multiple owners of property."'' Harold
Demsetz tacitly accepted the existence of a stage of primitive
communism in human cultural development,3 2 but he failed to
appreciate its significance as a cultural unity. His view was
warped by the assumption that primitive society can be analyzed
and explained solely in terms of economic theory.
Demsetz's theory of the development of private property rights
in land is really rather simple, once the economic jargon is pene-
trated. In essence, he holds that property rights developed
because of the overwhelming advantages they offered in terms of
material benefits to society. In his view, cultures that remained
anchored to a system of communal land tenure were incapable of
economic development, and therefore primitive, because the costs
of managing such a system rendered progress impossible. In his
own words, "a primary function of property rights is that of
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of exter-
nalities.' 3 3 Demsetz painted an interesting picture of primitive
society based on communal land tenure, which can be briefly
reproduced. "Communal ownership," he wrote, "means that the
community denies to the state or to individual citizens the right to
interfere with any person's exercise of communally owned
rights." '34 It follows, that, for example, individuals will overhunt
communal hunting grounds with a view to deriving the maximum
possible benefit for themselves. In order to obviate the impasse
created by such a situation, the members of the society are forced
to negotiate an agreement governing the use of the land. Because
it is difficult to reach an agreement satisfactory to all, the costs of
131. Demsetz, supra note 106, at 357.
132. Insofar as he accepted the conclusions of Leacock, discussed in section I.
133. Demsetz, supra note 106, at 348.
134. Id. at 354.
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negotiation will be very high, "especially when each hold-out has
the right to work the land as fast as he pleases." ' 13 5 Demsetz adds
that the society will incur tremendous costs in policing the agree-
ment."'
Finally, it is said to be impossible for a society recognizing
communal rights in land to plan for the future. "With communal
rights . . . the claims of the present generation will be given an
uneconomically large weight in determining the intensity with
which the land is worked."' 37 In contrast, Demsetz believes, all
these costs are "internalized" under a system of private owner-
ship. The individual owner may not need to negotiate with
anyone over the use of his land; there is no problem in policing
because his rights are recognized in law; and because he knows
that no one else can interfere with those rights, he can plan for
the future. Thus development of private property rights leads
society into the promised land of economic development, flowing
with the milk and honey of material wealth.
On closer inspection, Demsetz's theory appears not only simple
but simplistic. The Hobbesian view of primitive society as a nas-
ty, brutish collection of individuals, all intent on amassing for
themselves as large a share of the communal wealth as possible,
endlessly haggling over arrangements as to who gets what, and
then proceeding to violate their covenant as often as possible, is
so unrealistic as to be laughable. Presumably, in speaking of. the
costs of negotiating and policing an agreement, Demsetz is refer-
ring to the amount of time consumed. But he does not cite any
example of a society recognizing communal rights in land that in-
dulged in interminable and stormy pow-wows over the use of
such rights, nor in which disproportionate numbers of individuals
were detailed to police any agreements reached. No such society
has ever existed.
A study of Iroquoian and Algonkian institutions reveals that
the cost of negotiations relating to land use was not high because
of the characteristic shared concern for equity and welfare. The
cost of policing the use of land was minimal, where much
economic activity was conducted on a cooperative basis. Indian
children were not cheated of their economic rights by their
parents' failure to plan for the future: their plan was implicit in a
static way of life and found expression in the idea that the tribe
135. Id. at 354-55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 355.
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held the land as a trustee for future generations. "That he has
been expelled from the land, which was too sacred to become
even his own, is a bitter hardship, but it seems to him worst of all
that the unborn children of his race have been robbed of their
birthright .. ."138
Demsetz's theory is vitiated by a fundamental epistemological
error. Just as Morgan and Engels sought to describe historical
evolution in scientific terms, so Demsetz assumed that history
could be explained in terms of economic theory.
Classical economic theory was concerned with the question as
to what forces determine prices in a market economy.' 3 9 It
therefore assumed the existence of a market organization, as well
as a scarcity of resources-without which there could be no call
to economize.' 40 In primitive society, production and distribution
are generally organized by "transactional principles essentially
different from market exchange."' 14' Henry Maine understood
this facet of primitive culture: his theory that the trend of history
has been from status to contract has stood the test of a century of
anthropological research. 4 2 Moreover, George Dalton has made
the crucial point that a scarcity of resources exists only in a socie-
ty where man's material wants are regarded as insatiable, and
"which places great value on material acquisition, relative to
other goal attainments. .".,""4 in short, a society oriented to
economic growth.
These arguments should effectively dispose of any attempt to
analyze primitive cultures, or their relationship to modern socie-
ty, in terms of economic theory. Economic anthropologists,
however, have refused to capitulate. E. E. LeClair, for example,
thought to embarrass Dalton by inquiring "what other goal
attainments he has in mind. ' 144 The query is easily answered, in
reference to Iroquoian and Algonkian cultures. The welfare of all
members of society, cooperation in work, consensus government,
and communal land tenure were the elements of a way of life and
a spiritual path that were their own reward.
138. Grinnell, supra note 30, at 6.
139. Dalton, Economic Theory and Primitive Society, in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY
147 (LeClair & Schneider ed. 1968).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 152-53.
142. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (1924); Redfield, Maine's Ancient Law in the Light of
Primitive Societies, 3 W. POL. Q. 579 (1950).
143. Dalton, supra note 139, at 148.
144. LeClair, Economic Theory and Economic Anthropology, in ECONOMIC ANTHRO-
POLOGY 193 (LeClair & Schneider ed. 1968).
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It is apparent that Demsetz's theory assumes a continuity be-
tween primitive culture and modern Western society that simply
did not exist-the orientation toward economic development was
absent among the Iroquoian and Algonkian tribes. The failure of
these societies to achieve a higher standard of living in terms of
material wealth cannot, therefore, be explained solely by
reference to their institutions of communal land tenure. Rather, a
more inclusive theory should be attempted, based on an under-
standing of the fundamental interdependence of Indian land insti-
tutions, systems of government, work patterns, social goals, and
religious cosmology. Such a theory, if one can be constructed,
must be grounded on a deeper continuity.
It should perhaps be noted that in assuming economic develop-
ment to be the universal goal of all societies, Demsetz betrays an
unpardonable ethnocentrism. If his theory could be justified, it
would be necessary to regard societies that did not develop
private property institutions as innately inferior in a very real
sense. This is another result of the hubris which Henry Maine
detected in the mind of the economist: "the bias indeed of most
persons trained in political economy is to consider the general
truth on which their science reposes as entitled to become univer-
sal.,,1145
Demsetz's theory is open to criticism even in its own terms. It
is difficult to see how the relative cost-benefit advantages of
private property institutions can be compared to those of com-
munal systems at all. Should the comparison focus on costs and
benefits to the individual, or to the society as a whole? Assuming
arguendo that the focus is on the individual, it becomes necessary
to determine which individual. A private property system that
permits owners who do not work the land to appropriate it, and
to purchase the labor of those who do, obviously offers tremen-
dous benefits to some individuals, while others must bear heavy
costs. It is not clear that the value of the opportunity to derive
great benefit is ascertainable; and even if it were, it is doubtful
that such an evaluation would be meaningful. Furthermore, how
can the costs and benefits to the individual of a purely communal
system be calculated? It could be said that the individual within
such a system derived no benefit, since whatever benefits accrued
were in no sense personal to him; or it might be maintained that
the entire social benefit of the communal endeavor belonged to
145. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 296 (1924),
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the individual by virtue of his participation in the community. ,46
These alternatives would, of course, produce radically different
cost-benefit ratios: and both are patently inadequate descriptions
of reality. A third solution might simply divide costs and benefits
into equal shares bmong the participants in a communal system.
However, this would in effect require one to regard communal
and private systems as essentially identical, ignoring obvious dif-
ferences, and rendering the utility of a cost-benefit comparison
questionable, to say the least.
On the other hand, the analyst might focus on costs and bene-
fits to the society as a whole. It should be relatively easy to quan-
tify the material costs and benefits of administering a given com-
munal system, though it will not be clear whether that system had
reached its maximum potential in terms of generating material
wealth, unless other cultural elements are taken into account. It is
not so easy to arrive at a cost-benefit ratio for a society adhering
to private property institutions, where most calculations as to the
economic desirability of pursuing a given course of activity are
made on the basis of costs and benefits to individuals. Demsetz
simply ignores this problem: he accepts without qualification the
conventional view that "the externalities that accompany private
ownership of land do not affect all owners," or, presumably,
potential owners.' 47 If this view is rejected, and if it is
acknowledged that the actions of private owners can entail great
social costs, it becomes an open question whether the affluence of
modern society is not a tragic illusion.' 48
It is even possible that Demsetz's theory is upside down. It is in
modern society that endless negotiation over the use of land is to
be observed. It seems likely that the cost of policing the land is
higher today.' 49 Finally, it is only within a society where
economic growth is the established religion that it is necessary to
construct plans for future development: we have many plans, but
there is still a danger that we will end by cheating our children. Is
it possible that classical economic theory will cease to be of value
146. See Lao Tzu, Tao te Ching, (The Way of Life), Canto 77, (W. Bynner; Lyrebird
Press, 1972), at 95.
147. Demsetz, supra note 106, at 357.
148. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 295 (1971),
149. One is reminded, by way of allegory, of a scene from Werner Herzog's recent
film, "Stroszek," in which two Wisconsin farmers were involved in a dispute over the
boundary separating their fields. They spend all day riding up and down the disputed
territory on gargantuan tractors, each training a powerful rifle on the other to ensure that
he could not plow up the land.
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not only in historical analysis but in coping with the problems of
modern society? It has been suggested that "economic growth
renders many things obsolete, and one of the main things is
economic theory."' SO
These possibilities must be confronted, in spite of the evident
fact that modern Western societies have achieved enormous
technical progress. All that can really be said with any degree of
accuracy is that primitive communism and modern indus-
trialism-whether of the private or state capitalist variety-have
had different forms of wealth and impoverishment.
Demsetz did not succeed in explaining "the preponderance of
single rather than multiple owners of property."' 5' His theory
fails because it is based on a false continuity, and because it is
logically impossible to construct comparative cost-benefit ratios
for communal and private systems of land tenure. His arguments
testify to the persistence of an intellectually moribund tradi-
tion-Social Darwinism.
In view of their common nineteenth-century origins, it is
perhaps not surprising that the theories of Engels and Demsetz
are deficient in similar respects. Both are grounded on an ahis-
torical materialist determinism. While Demsetz, following Adam
Smith, remains convinced of the economic beneficence of indivi-
dualist capitalism, Engels considered that ultimately, economic
efficiency would require the abolition of private property.
Ironically, though both theories are clothed in the mantle of
scientific Wertfreiheit, it is clear that both are the result of
ideological apriorism.
Engels's theory is the more sophisticated, and a richer source
of inspiration to the historian, for two reasons. First, he was
capable of conceiving history as embracing a broader range of
determining forces, within the confines of historical materialism.
The Marxist appreciation of the power of material determinants,
in particular in the manifestation of class conflict, did much to
liberate history as a discipline from the clutches of Idealists. That
contribution should not be underestimated. In contrast,
Demsetz's materialism is so limited that it finally appears to be a
perverse form of crypto-Idealism. Second, Engels's formal accep-
tance of the concept of the dialectic, though incompatible with
his materialist determinism, permitted him to appreciate the con-
tinuity of history. The spiral as a conceptual vehicle for arriving
150. Kapp, quoted in COMMONER, supra note 148, 254.
151. Demsetz, supra note 106.
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at a comprehension of the significance of historical change is far
superior to the unilinearism which results from the consistent
application of scientific theories of causation to the study of
history. In the process of historical change, the past is absorbed
into the present, and the forces that shaped both past and present
continue to give life to the future. In contrast, Demsetz is incor-
rigibly unilinear: the past is irrevocably past, and continuity is
lost.
While it is not the purpose of this article to construct any com-
prehensive model of evolution, a brief consideration of the inter-
action between Indian and settler cultures in America may be use-
ful to a broader understanding of their relationship in. history.
V.
When the last Red man shall have become a myth among the
white men . . . when your childrens children think themselves
alone in the field, the store, upon the highway, or in the silence
of the pathless woods, they will not be alone. In all the world
there is no place dedicated to solitude. At night when the
streets of your cities are silent and you think them deserted,
they will throng with the returning hosts that once filled them,
and still love this beautiful land. The white man will never be
alone. Let him be just, and deal kindly with my people, for the
dead are not powerless. Dead-say I? There is no death. Only
a change of worlds.-Chief Seattle, 18 55 1
Because institutions of land tenure form an integral part of a
coherent way of life, the conflict over land in American history
cannot be understood outside the context of a broader cultural
interaction. A comprehensive analysis of Indian-settler interac-
tion is beyond the scope of this article, but it is suggested that its
history is colored by four major themes, which may be briefly
outlined. The disintegration of the Indian cultural milieu was cer-
tainly an important aspect of the relationship, though its tenacity
in the face of an assault on all fronts is not always appreciated. A
second feature, the influence of the Indian on the margins, and
even on the mainstream of the settler culture, has often been
neglected. That influence can to some extent be explained by a
third factor: for Indian institutions of land tenure had their
parallel in European history. Finally, the historical experience of
152. Speech to Gov. Isaac Stevens, at the signing of the Port Elliott Treaty; quoted in
THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANs, A SELECTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS BY EDWARD S. CURTIS 66
(J. Epes Brown ed. 1972),
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industrial capitalism in Western civilization has given rise to a
revival of communitarian insights, as well as communitarian
tendencies within Western institutions-a phenomenon which
may owe something to the role of the Indian in American history,
and at the very least renders the study of aboriginal society, with
its emphasis on egalitarian community, an area of immediate
relevance.
The fur trade was only one factor in the disintegration of
Algonkian and Iroquoian institutions. The important influence of
the fur trade itself resulted from the growing dependence of the
Indian on European commodities and technology: arrows,
fishhooks, axes, knives, kettles, hemp, wool, foodstuffs, and
firearms.'" Disease, widespread miscegenation, religious indoc-
trination, the introduction of new methods of warfare and
military leadership, and alcohol, were all attended by powerful
disintegrative effects on Indian culture.' 54
In later periods, the United States government made accultura-
tion and assimilation an explicit legislative policy. The reservation
was conceived as a school where the Indians could receive instruc-
tion in the ways of civilization.' 5 The most important part of the
curriculum offered in these schools related to institutions of land
tenure. T. Hartley Crawford, then Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs, gave classic expression to the views of the dominant settler
culture in 1838:
Unless some system is worked out by which there shall be a
separate allotment of land to each individual whom the scheme
shall entitle to it, you will look in Vain for any general casting
off of savagism. Common property and civilization cannot co-
exist . . . . If . . . the large tracts of land set apart for them
shall continue to be joint property, the ordinary motive to in-
dustry (and the most powerful one) will be wanting . . . . the
153. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 10.
154. Id. at 13. It appears that Louis XIV's great minister, Colbert, actively encourag-
ed intermarriage in order to ensure population levels which could compete with the
burgeoning English colonies. Id. at 16, 111.
Religious indoctrination occurred despite the language barrier, though missionaries
were sometimes taught indecent epithets, which they preached as Gospel. Id. at 102.
Prior to European contact, Algonkian tribes observed a prohibition on night attacks,
and posted no sentries about their encampments. Id. at 92, 96-97; id. at 43. See also
Quain, supra note 33, at 245.
155. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, (D.C. Or. 1888). See PRIcE, supra note 96, at
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indolent and dishonest will subsist at the expense of the
meritorious.'S6
Thus the reservation was to become the scene of an attempt to in-
culcate the tenets of Social Darwinism: laissez-faire competition
was incompatible not only with communal land but also with
cooperation in work and the idea that welfare was a concern of
the community. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887,1'" vast
tracts of land were subdivided, resulting in a legal and cultural
dislocation that is still evident today.' Indian opposition to the
allotment policy was widespread, not only because Indians valued
their cultural institutions but also because they feared the rapaci-
ty of the immigrant society.'
Their fears were justified. The professed concern to raise the
Indians from barbarism to civilization was by no means the only
aim of the allotment policy-and in most cases it was a trans-
parent rationalization. As Angie Debo has written, "unques-
tionably, land hunger was the real motive behind most of the agi-
tation to terminate the tribal regime .. "160 Allotment threw the
reservation open to economic development and left allotees a
prey to chicanery of all descriptions. "The general effect of allot-
ment was an orgy of plunder and exploitation probably un-
paralleled in American history."' 61 Many of those who profited
at the Indians' expense openly justified their actions as in the best
tradition of laissez-faire. 162 Like the black freedman, the Indian
must find his own level, and should not expect to derive special
favors from the law.
The allotment policy was finally reversed by the Wheeler-
Howard Act of 1934,163 which was characterized by a recognition
of cultural relativism; self-determination and continuity were
regarded as the most important elements of constructive develop-
ment. Later administrations, however, abandoned the ideals of
the Roosevelt era. The termination policies of the Eisenhower
156. Quoted in PRIcE, supra note 96, at 533.
157. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331 et seq.
158. In at least one instance, Indian opposition was overcome by federal troops.
PRicE, supra note 96, at 547.
159. Id. at 549.
160. DEBo, supra note 34, at 24.
161. Id. at 91.
162. Id. at 92 et seq.
163. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-476. See PPIcE, supra note 96, at 576 et seq.; DEao, supra
note 39, at 368 et seq.
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years represented a return to the goal of assimilation. ' ,, The city
was to replace the reservation as the school: the Indian was to
enter civilization as a member of the urban work-force rather
than be an independent farmer.1" The policies of the Nixon ad-
ministration followed the same approach, though an effort was
made to bring jobs to the reservation. 16 Indian land was once
again to be opened to development, while the Indian himself
became part of a labor pool at the disposal of the developer. 167
As M. E. Price has noted, "there is the possibility that economic
development-as widely understood-is itself chimerical, as
remote, romantic and false a goal as civilization was in the nine-
teenth century .... ,,168 Throughout the period, the professed
desire to educate and the urge to exploit and destroy have often
coincided perfectly in the mind of the settler culture. The Indian
has paid dearly for the privilege of participation in a modern
system grounded on private property and capitalism: he has
borne heavy costs and received few benefits. It has been sug-
gested that he owes his survival to his own traditions of coopera-
tion and community.1 69
America has been a school for the European as well as the In-
dian. The influence of the Indian on American culture has been
subtle, more of an ambush than a frontal assault: but that it has
often gone unperceived has not diminished its reality. In certain
areas that influence has been observed within the mainstream of
the American way of life. Felix Cohen wrote that:
It is out of a rich Indian democratic tradition that the
distinctive political ideals of American life emerged. Universal
suffrage for women as for men, the pattern of states within a
state that we call federalism, the habit of treating chiefs as ser-
vants of the people instead of their masters, the insistence that
the community must respect the diversity of men and the diver-
sity of their dreams-all these things were part of the American
way of life before Columbus landed. 7 '
164. W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS, 193-99 (1977).
165. PRIcE, supra note 96, at 612.
166. Id. at 607.
167. The parallel with black emancipation is not to be overlooked: many antislavery
advocates regarded the slaves as a valuable labor pool for the industrial north, and for
that reason, opposed and defeated proposals for a radical redistribution of land in the
south after the Civil war. See generally K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956).
168. PRICE, supra note 96, at 611.
169. Cohen, supra note 57.
170. Cohen, Americanizing the White Man, 21 AMERICAN SCHOLAR, No. 2, Spring
1952, 179-80.
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The influence of Indian democratic traditions was also felt in the
central currents of European political thought, through Mon-
taigne's noble savage, who played a significant role in the theories
of Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot,' 7 ' and Grotius.'"
Perhaps the Indian influence has been deepest in marginal
areas of American and European culture, particularly in the
development of a tradition of utopian radicalism. Thomas
More's utopia was itself a depiction of Indian society held up as a
mirror for Christians:
for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the
doers of the law shall be justified; for when the Gentiles, which
have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law,
these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which
show the work of the law written in their hearts, their con-
science also bearing witness .... 13
Radicals standing in the tradition of Rousseau, Engels, and
Kropotkin have looked to the communal institutions of the
Amerindian tribes as models of social harmony. Utopian com-
munities that have flourished and failed in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century America have often incorporated the most im-
portant characteristics of tribal society, whether by accident or by
design. Communal property, cooperation in work, a rudimentary
division of labor, all were features of these social experiments.,74
Public opinion and gossip took the place of coercive sanctions.'75
Like the Indian religious outlook, communitarian philosophy has
tended to emphasize the continuity of natural and spiritual
worlds. "For the Shakers, for example, this integration of values
and everyday events meant that even getting out of bed was an
act infused with meaning by community dictates . . . every
domestic act from baking to sweeping has spiritual meaning."176
During the first few centuries of contact between the two
cultures, many Europeans simply joined Indian tribes, finding no
difficulty in integrating with the communal way of life. Maurault
noted of the French colonists of Acadia that "la plupart se
marierent a des sauvagesses, et passerent le reste de leurs jours
171. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 25.
172. H. GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PAciS, Book II, ch. 2.
173. THE EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE ROMANS, ch. 2, 13-15.
174. R. KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY, COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 43-44, 94 (1972),
175. Id. at 46.
176. Id. at 39-40.
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avec les sauvages, adoptant leur maniere de vivre."1'" Michel de
Crevecoeur, an astute observer of the early United States,
remarked in 1782:
It cannot be, therefore, so bad as we generally conceive it to
be; there must be in the Indians' social bond something
singularly captivating, and far superior to be boasted of among
us; for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have no
examples of even one of these aborigines having from choice
become European.' 78
Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomenon is to be
found in the strong parallel between Indian institutions and the
remnant of a once vigorous communal tradition in Europe.
Agriculture in medieval England was organized communally by
each village. Under the open field system, land for cultivation
was not subdivided but was allotted to the husbandmen on an
equitable basis; pasturage rights were accorded on unallotted
common lands. 79 As Vinogradoff has written:
It is a remarkable arrangement; the more remarkable
because with all its inconveniences of communication, all its
backwardness in regard to improvements, all its trammels on
individual enterprise and thrift, all its awkward dependence of
the individual on the behaviour of his neighbors, it repeats
itself over and over again, not only over the whole of England
but over a great part of Europe. Powerful influences must have
been at work to originate and support it .... 180
The primitive communism of Algonkian and Iroquoian tribes had
its counterpart in England and throughout Europe."' Important
features of the European communal systems survived the growth
of feudalism: in England, the commons continued to provide the
margin of subsistence to small tenants, and to a landless pro-
letariat, well into the eighteenth century. However, the rise of
capitalism and the Industrial Revolution brought the final
assault: the process of enclosure by Act of Parliament in interests
of private landowners began early, but reached its height in the
period 1750-1850. During that century, six million acres of com-
177. Quoted in BAILEY, supra note 20, at 107.
178. Quoted in FARB, supra note 43, at 262.
179. See generally C. ORWIN, THE OPEN FIELDS (1938).
180. P. VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR 165-66 (1970).
181. See, e.g., P. KROPOTnN, MuTUAL AD (1972).
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mon land were enclosed by more than 4,000 separate parliamen-
tary bills. 182 Thus throughout the early period of contact between
settler and Indian cultures, communal institutions of land tenure
were under attack on both sides of the Atlantic.
During the English Revolution the defense of the communal
tradition found its earliest theoretical justification in the writings
of the philosopher of the Diggers, Jerrard Winstanley.
Winstanley regarded private property as the primary cause of
social conflict and crime in his society; 83 and he understood the
link between common land and welfare. "A man had better to
have no body than to have no food for it; therefore is this
restraining of the earth from brethren by brethren oppression and
bondage; but the free enjoyment thereof is true freedom."' 8 4 He
also anticipated Montesquieu's clear statement of the connection
between the growth of written law backed by coercive sanction
and the development of private property,'85 and grounded his
defense of communal institutions on an interpretation of Chris-
tianity which emphasized the immanence of God in all created
works, and an attitude of reverence toward the land itself. 16 His
words testify to the currency in seventeenth-century England of
values very similar to those implicit in the Indian way.
The course of history in the west has not been completely
defined by the liberal tradition, nor by the ideological primacy of
private property, central in the theories of Locke and Blackstone.
Rather, the rise and decline of that tradition has brought modern
society to a historical crossroads. There are many indications that
this development has an epochal significance.
The contrast between primitive and modern law can no longer
be drawn in terms of the emphasis on group or individual respon-
sibility. As Karl Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel have remarked,
"modern law has been moving uninterruptedly into the expansion
of group relations and of group responsibility: the party, the cor-
poration, the union, the co-operative, workmen's compensation
and respondeat superior."'87 It would seem that Henry Maine's
description of a linear evolution in legal history from status to
182. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 18 (1972).
183. G. WINSTANLEY, THE LAW OF FREEDOM IN A PLATFoRM 71 (1973).
184. Id. at 67.
185. Id. at 69, 133.
186. Id. at 112-13, 136; "To know the secrets of nature is to know the works of God;
and to know the works of God within the Creation is to know God himself, for God
dwells in every visible work or body."
187. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 44, at 50.
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contract should be revised in the light of modern developments.
For today, contract is dead. Grant Gilmore has summarized its
fate in the following terms:
For good or ill, we have changed all that. We are now all
cogs in a machine, each dependent on the other. The decline
and fall of the general theory of contract, and in most quarters
of laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflections
of the transition from nineteenth century individualism to the
welfare state and beyond.18 8
Maine was actually describing a partially completed spiral rather
than a linear evolution.
Moreover, the rule of law itself is increasingly drawn in ques-
tion. There is an inherent instability in the concept of formal
equality. In the words of Roberto Mangabeira Unger, "there is in
liberal society a pervasive contrast between the experience of per-
sonal dependence or domination and the ideal of organization by
impersonal rules." 18 9 Unger's magisterial analysis of the decline
of liberalism in Knowledge and Politics leads him to the percep-
tion of an emerging new social order, communitarian in form.' 90
As a Hegelian, Unger conceives of historical development as a
helix: his work pursues the spiral which Maine began.
The history of interaction and conflict between Indian and set-
tler cultures appears as a clash of cultures a world apart. Today,
this is no longer true: the gyre has come full circle.
The ecological crisis presents another clear indication of insta-
bility in the structure of modern society. The hidden costs to the
public of the exercise of private power can no longer be ignored.
Barry Commoner is not alone in asserting that the environmental
crisis is a crisis of survival,' and that "the ecological imperative
calls for the governance of productive processes by social
thrift-a criterion which is likely to conflict with private gain." 1 92
Finally, it is inconsistent with international equity for the
United States, representing 5.6 percent of the world's population,
to continue to consume 40 percent of the world's resources.' 93
Equity is itself a force to be reckoned with: and in any event, the
188. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-96 (1976).
189. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrICS 186-87 (1976). Or as William Blake put it,
"One law for the lion and the ox is oppression."
190. UNGER, supra note 189, at 294-95.
191. COMMONER, supra note 148, at 299-300.
192. Id. at 287.
193. SCHUMACHER, supra note 41, at 109.
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shift in the balance of international economic power which
became apparent with the Arab oil embargo will sooner or later
compel Western societies to accept lower living standards.
There are no foregone conclusions as to how Western societies
will adjust to these developments. Certainly, some change in the
structure of ownership of property as far-reaching as those ef-
fected by the great medieval English statutes, or the enclosure
movement is a possibility. This need not imply a massive central-
ization of power in the state, or the abolition of private property.
It is possible to conceive (as did the late E. F. Schumacher,
among others) of a system recognizing property rights only in-
sofar as they secure to the owner the product of his labor.
"Precisely in proportion as it is important to preserve the proper-
ty which a man has in the results of his labor, it is important to
abolish that which he has in the labor of someone else."'"9 This
was the very principle that governed the evolution of Algonkian
and Iroquoian property institutions.
These modern developments suggest that an understanding of
the fitnesses of Algonkian and Iroquoian cultures may have a
practical relevance for those who find in history a guide to
creative action. These Indian peoples were experienced in
methods of communal organization incorporating egalitarian
principles, 9 ' in their institutions of land tenure, in their daily
working lives, in their solutions to welfare problems, and in their
concept of man's relationship to nature and its ecology.
194. R. Tawney, quoted in id. at 248.
195. Other tribes, such as the Natchez, may have demonstrated the inner workings of
a community founded on rigid hierarchy. LoWIE, supra note 68, at 385.
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